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The	 decline	 of	 industry	 in	 Southern	 Africa	 has	 prompted	 James	 Ferguson	 to	 question	 the	 bases	 on	
which	the	region’s	poor	may	justify	claims	on	resources,	if	not	through	their	labour.	This	article	builds	
from	Fergsuon’s	work	by	looking	at	the	continuing	importance	of	chieftaincy	to	distributive	politics	in	
Malawi.	 I	 use	 a	 case	 study	 of	 a	 government	 agricultural	 extension	 programme	 in	 a	 village	 in	 rural	

















are	 made	 through	 chieftaincy	 in	 Malawi	 and	 the	 implications	 the	 institution	 has	 for	 social	 and	
economic	 inequality	 in	 the	 country.	 The	 Malawi	 government’s	 Farm	 Input	 Subsidy	 Programme	
(FISP),	 introduced	 in	 2005,	 was	 designed	 to	 boost	 the	 agricultural	 productivity	 of	 the	 country’s	
poorest	farmers	in	order	that	they	might	be	better	able	to	produce	crops	for	sale	and	for	their	own	
subsistence	 (Chirwa	 and	Dorward	2013,	Holden	 and	 Lunduka	2013,	 Eggen	2012,	 Chinsinga	 2010).	
The	logic	of	the	FISP	was	however	envisaged	differently	in	the	village	of	Chimtengo	Kubwalo,	where	
I	did	ethnographic	 fieldwork	over	2012	and	2013.	People	there	made	claims	on	FISP	resources	on	
the	basis	of	 their	connection	to	 their	Village	Head,	as	much	as	on	their	 relative	ability	 to	produce	
crops.	While	resources	were	not	concentrated	with	the	poorest	people	in	the	village,	neither	were	
they	without	 the	ability	 to	 influence	their	distribution.	 I	argue	that	 the	way	the	FISP	 fertiliser	was	
distributed	 in	 the	 village	 suggests	 that	 the	 institution	 of	 chieftaincy	 can	 prevent	 inequality	
developing	in	contemporary	Malawi,	but	only	amongst	those	who	are	already	extremely	poor.		
	








While	 admitting	 that	 historic	 labour	 regimes	 maintained	 and	 proliferated	 significant	 social	
inequality,	 Ferguson	 suggests	 that	 the	 kind	 of	 ‘asocial’	 inequality	 that	 has	 developed	 in	 Southern	
Africa	in	recent	decades	is	even	more	troubling	(2015	p.	156-157).	Rather	than	being	incorporated	






with	 hereditary	 chiefs	 and	 piles	 of	 yams	 and	 more	 concerned	 with	 such	 things	 as	 state	
bureaucracies,	 taxation,	 and	 programs	 of	 social	 protection…’	 (Ferguson	 2015	 p.	 90).	 However,	
Ferguson	also	acknowledges	the	fact	that	the	rise	of	labour	during	the	colonial	period	did	not	simply	
mean	that	old	justifications	for	claims	to	resources	lost	moral	traction,	or	have	not	been	important	





studying	 chiefs.	 In	 Malawi	 chiefs	 were	 incorporated	 into	 the	 British	 colonial	 government	 under	
indirect	 rule	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘traditional	 leaders’	 within	 the	 state	 has,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	
continued	to	be	asserted	ever	since	(McCracken	2012	p.	222-223,	Eggen	2011).	At	the	time	I	did	my	
fieldwork	a	hierarchy	of	 traditional	authority	 linked	 ‘Village	Heads’,	 chiefs	over	as	 few	as	a	dozen	
adults,	 to	 ‘Group	Village	Heads’,	 to	 ‘Traditional	 Authorities’	 and	 to	 ‘Paramount	 Chiefs’,	 the	 latter	
having	authority	over	tens	of	thousands	of	people	or	more.	Amongst	other	activities,	the	literature	
on	 chiefs	 in	 Malawi	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 they,	 as	 much	 as	 bureaucrats	 and	 officials,	 who	 broker	
government	 development	 and	 welfare	 programmes	 like	 the	 FISP	 (Swidler	 2013,	 Englund	 2012,	
Eggen	2012,	2011,	Cammack	et	al	2009).		
	
The	 case	 of	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 village	 suggests	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 influence	 chiefs	 have	 over	
distribution	 in	Malawi,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 institution	 limits	 or	 proliferates	 inequality.	 I	
draw	out	 two	ways	 in	which	 the	 distribution	 of	 FISP	was	 justified	morally	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	





Ferguson’s	 term.	 Secondly	 the	 distributional	 ‘work’	 (nchito)	 that	 the	 village	 chief	 and	 other	
members	 of	 the	 village	 did	 was	 acknowledged	 through	 the	 distribution.	 Ferguson	 writes	 of	 the	









Mahmood	 Mamdani’s	 (1996)	 proposed	 that	 colonial	 powers	 turned	 chiefs	 into	 ‘decentralised	





with	 their	 people.	 I	 suggest	 that	 chiefs’	 relative	 ability	 to	 exert	 influence	 turns	 around	 the	
availability	 of	 these	 relationships	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 with	 which	 chiefs	 mediate	 them.	Where	
chiefs	are	able	to	depend	on	chiefs	above	them	in	Malawi’s	chiefly	hierarchy,	or	on	the	President	
and	 members	 Malawi’s	 central	 government,	 or	 even	 on	 a	 salaried	 job,	 the	 nature	 of	 their	
dependence	on	their	people	changes.	Equally,	where	their	people	cannot	make	other	‘declarations	
of	dependence’	 (Ferguson	2015	p.	146)	 themselves,	outside	of	 the	 institution	of	 chieftaincy,	 then	
they	will	be	less	able	to	press	claims	with	their	chiefs.		
	
Setting	 the	case	of	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	village	 in	historical	 context,	 I	 am	able	 to	 show	the	way	 in	
which	 the	opportunities	 its	people	and	 its	chiefs	have	 to	make	 ‘declarations	of	dependence’	have	
waxed	and	waned	over	time.	 In	this	 longue	durée,	 the	Farm	Input	Subsidy	Programme	appears	as	
the	latest	in	a	series	of	interventions	that	have	created	opportunities	for	chiefs	and	people	to	make	
new	 relationships,	 and	 to	 remake	 old	 ones.	 These	 interventions	 have	 not	 simply	 supplanted	 one	
another,	but	have	 ‘layered	up’	 in	the	social	 landscape	of	the	village	and	the	surrounds,	shaped	by	
those	that	have	gone	before	them	(Jones	2009	p.	26).	I	use	the	case	to	suggest	how	migrant	labour,	
old	 agricultural	 extension	 programmes,	 and	 changes	 to	 the	 status	 of	 chiefs	 within	 the	Malawian	
state	in	the	past	structure	the	way	in	which	to	which	chiefs	operate	in	Malawi	in	the	contemporary	




Long-term	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 village	 in	 the	 Central	 Region	 of	Malawi	
inspired	 the	 focus	 on	 chiefs	 in	 this	 article.	 I	 spent	 over	 fifteen	 months	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	
between	 2012	 and	 2013,	 a	 period	 that	 covered	 one	 complete	 cycle	 of	 the	 Farm	 Input	 Subsidy	
Programme.	 I	 lived	 with	 a	 family	 during	 that	 time,	 learning	 the	 local	 language,	 Chichewa,	 and	
participating	 in	 the	daily	 life	of	 the	 village.	On	my	arrival	 I	 had	only	 general	questions	 to	 ask	 and	
largely	engaged	in	conversation	with	people	as	they	went	about	what	they	were	doing,	rather	than	
undertaking	more	 structured	 forms	 of	 interview.	 As	 Katy	 Gardner	writes,	 this	 kind	 of	 participant	
observation,	 ‘rarely	 feels	 like	 ‘proper’	 research…	[but]	 is,	however,	 the	only	way	 that	 the	detailed	








While	 the	 focus	of	 this	article	 is	on	chieftaincy,	 in	 this	section	 I	briefly	highlight	 the	other	ways	 in	
which	people	 in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	 justified	claims	to	resources,	as	 I	 introduce	village.	The	other	






subsistence	 in	 the	 village	 and	 in	Malawi	 as	 a	whole,	 Ferguson’s	 question	 about	 how	 the	 poor	 of	





nuclear	 family	 is	 the	 main	 unit	 of	 production	 and	 consumption	 (Bryceson	 2006,	 Englund	 1999).	
Agricultural	work	within	households	in	the	village	was	gendered,	although	not	exclusively	so;	wives	
mostly	worked	cultivating	maize,	the	staple	crop,	while	their	husbands	took	most	responsibility	for	




village	 that	 farmed	 grew	 groundnuts	 for	 sale,	which	 required	 far	 less	 fertilizer	 than	 tobacco,	 but	






in	 the	 village	 and	 did	 piecework	 there,	 as	 well	 as	 brewing	 beer	 and	 engaging	 in	 other	 business	
activities.	 Rates	 for	 piecework	 varied,	 but	 a	 day’s	 labour	making	 ridges	 in	 a	 field	 near	Chimtengo	
Kubwalo	could	earn	a	pieceworker	up	to	MK	1000	(3	USD).	By	way	of	comparison,	one	man	from	the	
village	who	worked	for	Chinese	contractors	 in	Lilongwe	for	a	couple	of	months	earned	MK	15,000	
(46	 USD).	 As	 critics	 have	 pointed	 out,	 the	 ongoing	 importance	 of	 such	 work	 casts	 doubt	 on	
Ferguson’s	 thesis	 that	 poverty	 in	 contemporary	Malawi	 should	 be	blamed	on	disconnection	 from	











the	 form	of	maize.	 People	 also	 offered	 ‘help’	 (thandizo)	 in	 the	 form	of	 their	 labour.	 These	 offers	
however,	 like	 requests	 made	 for	 help	 of	 the	 former	 variety,	 were	 frequently	 perceived	 as	
illegitimate	by	those	who	received	them	and	described	as	‘begging’	(kupempha).	As	Davison	(1993)	
describes	 having	 been	 the	 case	 in	 Southern	 Malawi,	 households	 often	 preferred	 to	 pay	











of	 the	village.	Of	 the	 fourteen	households	 that	made	up	Chimtengo	Kubwalo,	 two	were	generally	
regarded	as	being	‘rich’	(olemera).	These	were	the	household	I	stayed	in,	headed	by	a	man	named	
David	Kaso,	and	another	headed	by	his	brother,	Harold.	The	other	households	in	the	village	were	all	
considered	 to	 be	 of	 average	 wealth	 for	 the	 area,	 including	 the	 Chief’s,	 although	 they	 were	 not	
completely	without	differentiation	amongst	themselves.	As	in	other	nearby	villages	the	households	








had	been	distributed	 there.	Having	 gotten	married	 he	 and	his	wife	 relied	 on	 piecework	 and	help	
from	other	households	in	the	village	and	local	area	for	the	rest	of	the	time	I	was	in	the	village.	
	
It	 was	 partly	 because	 of	 requests	 for	 help	 for	 the	 very	 poor	 that	 the	 wealthiest	 households	 in	
Chimtengo	Kubwalo	and	the	surrounds	made	little	in	the	way	of	‘profit’	(phindu).	They	also	had	to	
put	much	of	the	money	they	made	in	one	year	back	into	growing	enough	maize	and	other	crops	to	
survive	 the	 following	 year.	 Like	 their	 fellow	 villagers,	 David,	 Harold	 and	 the	 members	 of	 their	




Despite	 being	 poorer	 than	 David	 and	 Harold,	 connection	 to	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo2	 was	
particularly	important	to	all	the	households	in	the	village.	This	was	not	just	because	of	the	ritual	and	





In	 September	 2012	 fertiliser	 and	 the	 FISP	 were	 common	 topics	 of	 conversation	 in	 Chimtengo	
Kubwalo	as	people’s	attentions	turned	to	the	planting	season.	Aside	from	piecework	and	the	sale	of	






market.	Most	people	 felt	 they	needed	two	or	 three	bags	to	come	close	to	 farming	enough	food	to	














the	 iterations	 of	 the	 programme	 that	 existed	 in	 the	 years	 immediately	 prior	 to	 2012	Ministry	 of	
Agriculture	 and	 Food	 Security	 staff,	 chiefs	 and	 village	 members	 are	 meant	 to	 identify	 a	 village’s	






living	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 village	 was	 that	 by	 targeting	 poorer	 farmers,	 it	 would	 improve	 their	
ability	 to	 produce	 crops,	 both	 for	 their	 own	 subsistence,	 and	 for	 sale	 on	 the	market	 (Chirwa	 and	
Dorward	 2013).	 In	 the	 programme	 the	 person’s	 value	 is	 in	 this	 way	 defined	 by	 their	 ability	 to	








the	 case	 of	 FISP,	 senior	 chiefs	 in	 particular	 seem	 often	 to	 have	 been	 able	 to	 depend	 on	 their	
connections	 in	 central	government,	and	 to	officials	and	bureaucrats,	 rather	 than	on	 the	chiefs	and	




odds	with	 the	 interests	 of	 poor	 farmers,	 even	 if	 inputs	 are	not	 concentrated	 in	 their	 hands	 as	 the	
official	 logic	 of	 the	 programme	 dictates.	 Village	 chiefs	 seem	 to	 be	 particularly	 constrained	 in	 this	
respect.	 Eggen	 for	 example,	 writes	 that	 ‘equal	 sharing	 -	 with	 some	 tolerance	 for	 slightly	 more	
resources	 to	 the	 chief	 -	 is	 a	 norm	 firmly	 positioned	 in	 local	 discourse’	 (2012	 p.	 17).	 Harri	 Englund	
describes	people	choosing	a	new	Village	Head	for	themselves,	partly	because	of	discontent	over	the	
way	their	chief	had	been	distributing	FISP	inputs	(Englund	2012	also	see	Verheijen	2013	p.	209-210).	
While	 some	manage	 to	do	so,	 it	 seems	 that	 it	 is	often	difficult	 for	Village	Heads	 to	act	against	 the	
interests	of	their	people.			
	
People	 in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	 asserted	 the	moral	 ‘justice’	 (chilungamo)	 of	 a	 similar	distribution	 to	
that	which	Eggen	describes,	and	demonstrated	the	capacity	to	effectively	press	for	the	FISP	fertiliser	
to	be	shared	 in	 this	way.	People	 told	me	the	 fertiliser	 should	and	would	be	shared	equally,	as	one	
women	put	it	‘one,	one,	one,	one,	it	will	be	shared	one	bag	per	[household]’.	This	was	the	position	of	
the	people	 I	 talked	 to	who	 lived	 in	 surrounding	 villages	 as	well.	 To	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo,	 and	
other	villagers,	extent	of	 the	provision	of	 fertiliser	by	Malawi’s	Presidents	was	 the	key	measure	by	
which	 they	 were	 judged.	 President	 Bingu	 wa	 Mutharika,	 who	 had	 instituted	 the	 FISP,	 was	
remembered	 as	 a	 good	 President,	 because	 he	 had	 ‘provided	 fertiliser’.	 President	 Kamuzu	 Banda,	
Malawi’s	 first	 President	 after	 independence	 was	 similarly	 remembered	 for	 ‘caring’	 for	 the	 people	
through	his	provision	of	 fertiliser.	 I	discuss	 the	history	of	agricultural	 inputs	 later	 in	 the	article.	For	
now,	it	 is	import	only	to	emphasise	the	fact	that	people	implied	that	Malawi’s	Presidents	sat	at	the	
top	of	the	country’s	hierarchy	of	traditional	authority	and	that	in	their	claims	on	FISP	fertiliser	were	
not	 just	 based	 on	membership	 of	 the	 village	 but	 also	 the	 fact	 the	 President	 also	 had	 distributive	
responsibilities	towards	them.		
	





that	 this	 was	 how	 the	 distribution	 had	 always	 been	 handled.	 Chief	 Chitmengo	 Kubwalo	 visited	
everyone	in	the	village	to	discuss	the	FISP	over	the	course	of	October	and	November,	the	distribution	
of	the	coupons	and	their	exchange	for	fertiliser	being	expected	sometime	at	the	start	of	December.	
Many	 villagers	 also	went	 to	 Chief	 Chimtengo	Kubwalo’s	 house	 to	 ask	 him	 for	 FISP	 fertiliser.	 These	





It	was	 through	 this	hierarchy	of	 chiefs	 that	villagers	explained	 that	 the	 fertiliser	 coupons	would	be	
distributed.	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 worried	 towards	 of	 the	 end	 of	 November	 that	 the	 FISP	
coupons	might	not	make	it	into	his	hands	at	all.	There	had	been	reports	on	the	radio	of	instances	of	
senior	 chiefs	 and	 government	 officials	 appropriating	 FISP	 fertiliser	 coupons	 and	 redirecting	 them	
away	 from	Village	Heads	and	 their	people	 in	other	parts	of	Malawi.	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	was	
concerned	 that	 something	 similar	might	 happen	 to	 the	 coupons	 destined	 for	 the	 area	 around	 the	
village.	 In	 the	 end	 the	 village	 was	 assigned	 twelve	 coupons,	 equivalent	 to	 twenty-four	 bags	 of	








with	 one	 bag	 of	 fertiliser.	When	 I	 asked	 poorer	members	 of	 the	 village	 what	 they	 felt	 about	 the	
distribution,	they	explained	that	it	was	to	be	expected	that	these	households	would	receive	more	as	
they	 were	 headed	 by	 ‘big	 men’	 (aakulu).	 The	 ‘big	 men’	 justified	 their	 shares	 as	 using	 the	 same	
reasoning.	David	pointed	out	that	he	had	the	largest	family	in	the	village,	including	several	‘orphan’	
children	whose	parents	had	died	or	moved	elsewhere,	and	had	no	one	to	care	for	them.	He,	Harold	
and	Yamikani	 said	 that	many	of	 the	villagers	 ‘depended’	 (kudalira)	on	 them	for	 food	 in	 the	hungry	
season.	Poorer	than	David,	Harold	and	Yamikani,	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo’s	receipt	of	a	larger	share	













himself	 complained	 that	 he	 spent	 a	 lot	 of	 time	mediating	 ‘cases’	 (milandu)6;	 ‘I	 just	 go	 around	 and	
around’	(kuyendayenda).	Stating	that	the	chieftaincy	was	a	desirable	position	could	of	course	lead	to	
troubling	 accusations	 of	 covetousness;	 modesty	 has	 tended	 to	 be	 expected	 amongst	 prospective	
chiefly	candidates	in	Malawi	(Englund	2002	p.	141).	But	not	all	of	the	reservations	people	expressed	








complaints	 simply	be	explained	as	 instrumental	 appeals	 for	 sympathy.	 Events	 that	 surrounded	 the	
distribution	of	 the	FISP	 fertiliser	 in	 the	village	 in	2012	served	 to	suggest	 the	 limits	of	 the	power	or	
control	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	and	other	village	chiefs	had	in	the	distribution	of	FISP.	
	
On	 our	 return	 from	 the	 depot	 where	 the	members	 of	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 village	 had	 exchanged	
their	 coupons	 for	 fertiliser,	 David	 told	me	 that	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 had,	 at	 the	 last	minute,	
decided	to	take	one	of	Yamikani’s	bags	of	fertiliser	for	himself,	 leaving	Yamikani	with	only	two,	and	
the	 chief	 with	 five.	 The	 decision	 provoked	 far	 more	 comment	 and	 complaint	 than	 the	 original	
distribution,	 suggesting	moral	 limits	 around	 how	much	 wealth	 a	 chief	 might	 justifiably	 accrue	 for	
himself	and	his	own	household.	Over	the	following	days	it	became	apparent	that	no	one	in	the	village	







insolent’	 (kuchita	 chipongwe).	 But	 he	 was	 also	 anxious,	 and	 tried	 to	 get	 other	 villagers	 to	 talk	 to	
Yamikani	 on	 his	 behalf	 in	 order	 to	 ‘console’	 (kupepetsa)	 him.	 A	 few	 weeks	 later	 Chief	 Chitengo	
Kubwalo	and	Yamikani	were	on	speaking	terms	again	but	the	Chief	continued	to	worry	that	Yamikani	





The	woman,	 Esnarth	Mitambo,	was	by	 local	 standards,	 ‘very	poor’	 (osauka	 kwambiri);	 she	headed	
her	household	alone	and	had	 relied	on	piecework	 to	 survive	 for	most	of	her	 life.	 In	October	Chief	
Chimtengo	 Kutsidya	 to	 hold	 her	 that	 she	 would	 receive	 FISP	 fertiliser.	 However	 the	 Chief	
subsequently	 decided	 to	 take	 a	 greater	 share	 of	 the	 village’s	 fertiliser	 for	 himself,	 by	withholding	
Esnarth’s	coupon.	She	did	not	take	this	well;	‘Kutsidya	will	cry	for	what	he	has	done’	Esnarth	insisted	
while	 talking	 to	 some	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 villagers	 and	 myself.	 With	 the	 support	 of	 some	 other	
members	of	Chimtengo	Kutsidya,	and	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	and	other	local	chiefs,	Esnarth	called	
a	‘case’	against	Chief	Chimtengo	Kutsidya	that	was	heard	by	the	Group	Village	Head.	Chief	Chimtengo	
Kubwalo	 came	 back	 saying	 that	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kutsidya	 had	 been	 contrite,	 and	 ended	 up	
complaining	to	the	Group	Village	Head,	 ‘“I	do	not	want	to	be	a	chief,	 it	should	go	to	someone	else,	




were	 concentrated	 with	 the	 poorest	 people	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 and	 the	 surrounding	 villages,	
neither	did	it	necessarily	mean	that	Village	Heads	could	act	without	any	regard	for	them.	Everyone	I	




far	greater	quantity	of	 resources	than	were	available	through	the	FISP.	 In	this	 respect	people	were	
trapped	 by	 their	 poverty	 and	 inequality.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 cases	 from	 the	 2012	 FISP	
programme	suggest	that	the	actions	of	Village	Heads	could	be	sharply	delimited	by	the	actions	of	the	









Chewa	 chief’s	 position	 remained	 dependent	 upon	 the	 adequate	 fulfilment	 of	 their	 responsibilities	
towards	 their	 people,	 more	 than	 on	 hereditary	 claims.	 Where	 chiefs	 failed	 to	 meet	 these	
responsibilities,	which	included	the	distribution	of	resources,	new	villages	and	chieftaincies	‘budded	
off’	 from	 existing	 ones	 (Rangeley,	 1948	 p.	 10,	 Marwick,	 1965	 p.	 139).	 As	 Ferguson	 argues	 in	 his	
history	of	the	Southern	African	region	(2015	p.	142-146,	2013),	the	wide	and	equal	availability	of	land	
and	other	 resources	at	 the	 time	meant	 that	people	had	a	high	degree	of	 freedom	to	declare	 their	
dependence	 on	 chiefs	 of	 new	 polities,	 should	 their	 existing	 leaders	 fail	 to	 adequately	 fulfil	 their	
responsibilities	7.	
	
The	 British	 policy	 of	 indirect	 rule	 incorporated	 chiefs	 into	 the	 colonial	 administration	 (McCracken	
2012	p.	222-223,	Eggen	2011	p.	316-317).	Indirect	rule	implied	a	challenge	to	the	egalitarian	political	




being	 the	 case,	 the	 extent	 to	which	 chiefs,	 and	particularly	Village	Heads,	 could	 ignore	or	 oppress	




-	 an	 alternative	way	of	 accruing	wealth	 and	 status,	 away	 from	 the	 institution	of	 chieftaincy.	Many	
Chewa	 were	 amongst	 those	 James	 Ferguson	 describes	 ‘voluntarily’	 migrating	 to	 labour	 in	 the	
industrial	economies	of	Rhodesia	and	South	Africa	during	the	colonial	period	(Ferguson	2015	p.	147,	
McCracken,	2012	p.	178-188,	256-260).	At	home,	where	the	colonial	appropriation	of	land	for	estates	
and	 plantations	 was	 largely	 restricted	 to	 the	 Southern	 Region,	 many	 Chewa	 people	 were	 also	
incorporated	 into	 the	 colonial	 economy	 as	 smallholder	 producers	 of	 tobacco.	 Tobacco	 production	
was	 led	 by	 ‘Master	 Farmers’	 who,	 having	 been	 selected	 by	 colonial	 officials,	 received	 training,	
equipment	 and	 inputs	 that	 enabled	 them	 to	 become	 small-scale	 agricultural	 capitalists,	 employing	
other	people	on	their	farms	(Mapila	et	al.,	2010	p.	148,	McCracken,	2012	p.	251).	The	relationships	
that	 certain	 individuals	 were	 able	 to	 forge	 through	 migrant	 labour	 abroad,	 and	 with	 colonial	








These	 claims,	 based	on	non-market	 principles,	 continued	 to	matter	 to	both	migrant	 labourers	 and	
Master	 Farmers.	 McCracken	 for	 example	 notes	 relations	 of	 kinship	 and	 affect	 remained	 key	
considerations	in	Master	Farmer’s	provision	of	labour	to	pieceworkers	(2012	p.	251).	While	migrants	
used	their	status	as	labourers	to	justify	their	possession	and	use	of	their	earnings,	neither	were	they	















through	 the	 different	 connections	 he	 was	 able	 to	 make	 and	 maintain	 through	 this	 period.	 Born	
Stanley	in	1918,	he	had	migrated	from	the	village,	at	that	time	simply	called	Chimtengo,	during	the	
1940s.	 He	 subsequently	 spent	 long	 periods	working	 in	 South	Africa	 through	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s.	
Stanley	maintained	 good	 relations	with	people	 in	 the	 village	 through	 the	provision	of	 regular	 cash	
remittances.	So	well	did	he	support	 relatives	and	other	people	at	home	that	on	the	death	of	Chief	
Chimtengo	Two,	the	elders	of	the	village	declared	him	the	new	chief	of	the	village.	This	was	despite	




On	 his	 return	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three	 used	 his	 savings	 to	 enter	 the	 ‘Master	 Farmer’	 (Chikumbi)	
programme,	which	had	continued	to	run	after	Malawi	became	independent	in	1964.	At	that	time,	as	
during	the	colonial	era,	those	farmers	who	already	had	capital	were	favoured	for	selection	(Mapila	et	
al.	2010,	McCracken	2012	p.	251).	Villagers	 remembered	 that	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	continued	 to	
amass	wealth	 through	 farming	during	 the	1970s	 and	1980s;	 he	planted	 several	 stands	of	 trees	 for	
lumber,	bought	hundreds	of	layer	hens	and	various	kinds	of	livestock.	He	obtained	an	ox-plough	-	a	





for	 people	 in	 the	 village,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 relatives	 and	 acquaintances	 living	 elsewhere.	 I	 was	 told	
piecework	had	always	been	plentiful	during	Chief	Chimtengo	Three’s	chieftaincy	while	my	host	David	
Kaso	 said	 on	 several	 occasions	 that	 Chimtengo	 Three	 ‘helped	 many	 people’,	 including	 him,	 with	
things	 like	school	 fees.	 It	was	the	way	 in	which	he	had	used	his	material	wealth	to	support	others,	





around	 the	 village	 could	 press	 ‘declarations	 of	 dependence’	 on	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three.	When	 his	





like	Aleke,	 resented	Chief	Chimtengo	Three’s	wealth.	Harold	Kaso	 said	 that	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	
had	nonetheless	 ‘just	 gone	ahead,	working	hard’.	 People	 like	Aleke	 that	 left	 the	 village	were	 soon	




context	 in	 Malawi	 at	 that	 time.	 President	 Kamuzu	 Banda	 and	 his	 government	 had	 made	 few	
fundamental	changes	to	the	Malawian	economy	following	independence	from	Britain.	Alterations	did	
begin	to	take	place	in	the	1970s,	migrant	labour	abroad	was	curtailed	and	subsidies	and	supports	for	
smallholders	 were	 removed	 (Chirwa,	 1996,	 Kydd	 and	 Christiansen,	 1982).	 These	 changes	 had	 the	
effect	of	 forcing	more	Malawians	 into	 labour	on	Malawi’s	estates	and	plantations,	which	had	been	



















the	 same	opportunities	 as	 the	 old	 Chief.	Unable	 to	work	 abroad,	 he	 took	 up	 poorly	 paid	work	 on	




fertiliser	 available	 in	 the	 village	 at	 the	 time,	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three’s	 position	 as	 a	Master	 Farmer	
allowing	 him	not	 just	 to	 provide	 villagers	with	 piecework,	 but	 also	with	 fertiliser	 and	 other	 inputs	










that	 he	 became	 village	 chief	 himself.	 David	 described	 to	me	 how	 the	 elders	 of	 Chimtengo	met	 to	
discuss	 (-kambirana)	 the	 succession	 on	 the	 day	 of	 Chimtengo	 Three’s	 funeral,	 in	 keeping	 with	
‘tradition’	 (mwambo).	 They	 decided	 that	 it	 would	 be	 ‘doing	 justly’	 (-chita	 chilungamo)	 for	 the	
chieftaincy	to	move	to	another	family	in	the	village,	other	than	Chimtengo	Three’s,	and	with	this	 in	
mind	 selected	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo.	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 said	 he	 had	 been	 extremely	 reluctant	 to	
become	 chief,	 barring	 himself	 in	 his	 house	 when	 he	 was	 asked	 to	 come	 to	 see	 the	 elders,	 only	
agreeing	 to	 take	 the	 chieftaincy	 after	 some	 hours;	 ‘I	 refused	 vehemently’	 he	 told	 me.	 When	 he	
explained	his	reluctance	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	made	the	same	complaints	about	the	‘work’	involved	in	
chieftaincy	 that	 he	 did	 on	 other	 occasions.	 But	 he	 also	 cited	 events	 that	 took	 place	 around	 his	
entrance	into	the	chieftaincy	as	evidence	for	his	claims	about	the	ambivalence	of	the	position.			
	
Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 and	 members	 of	 the	 village	 told	 me	 that	 even	 as	 the	 discussions	 about	 the	





name	Grimson	 Sauka.	Unbeknown	 to	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 and	 the	 village	 elders,	 both	 these	
factions	had	courted	the	support	of	other	local	chiefs	in	their	bids	to	form	separate	villages.	Harold	













the	 Traditional	 Authority.	 With	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three	 gone,	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 and	 the	
villagers	who	stayed	with	him	 found	 they	did	not	have	enough	 resources	or	 influence	 to	get	other	
local	chiefs	to	side	with	them.	Kadango	Msaka	became	Chief	Chimtengo	Kutsidya,	whilst	the	leader	of	




FISP	 was	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 explanations	 I	 was	 given	 for	 the	 break	 up	 of	 Chimtengo	 village.	
Unsurprisingly	 the	moral	 valence	 people	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 ascribed	 to	 Kunjira	 and	 Kutsidya’s	
actions	was	different	 to	 the	one	 the	chiefs	offered	me	 themselves.	When	 I	asked	Chief	Chimtengo	
Kubwalo	 about	 the	 division	 he	 said,	 ‘They	 [Kutsidya	 and	 Kunjira]	 were	 causing	 trouble	 over	 the	
fertiliser,	 they	 thought	 that	 they	would	 get	more	 if	 they	had	 their	 own	 villages.’	David	meanwhile	
said	 that	 they	 had	 been	 able	 to	 persuade	 other	 chiefs	 to	 support	 them	 by	 promising	 to	 ‘share	
fertiliser’	with	them.	Chimtengo	Three,	David	and	other	people	in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	spoke	of	the	
‘greed’	 (umbombo)	 of	 Kutsidya	 and	 Kunjira.	 When	 I	 asked	 them	 why	 they	 had	 broken	 with	
Chimtengo	Kubwalo	both	chiefs	 said	 they	had	wanted	 to	 ‘get	 fertiliser’.	They	did	not	however	 feel	
that	they	had	been	greedy,	but	rather	had	reasonable	concerns	about	the	distribution	of	resources	in	




There	was	 little	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 or	 the	 village	 elders	 could	 do	 about	 the	 division	 of	 the	
village	because	of	the	structure	of	the	FISP	programme,	and	the	turn	local	and	national	politics	had	
taken	 in	 the	 1990s.	 Kamuzu	 Banda’s	 personal	 idiosyncrasies	 and	 caprice	 notwithstanding,	
dependence	on	him,	and	senior	officials,	chiefs	and	Master	Farmers	supported	by	him,	had	been	the	
only	 way	 of	 assuring	 security	 and	 prosperity	 during	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 his	 rule	 (van	 Donge	 1995,	
Cammack	 2010,	 2011).	 On-going	 donor	 support	 secured	 Banda’s	 position	 even	 as	 the	 Malawian	
economy	 had	 atrophied	 through	 1980s.	 After	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 however	 donor	 priorities	
changed,	a	 focus	on	human	 rights	and	 liberalism	creating	new	political	 conditions	 that	allowed	 for	
Malawians	to	press	their	discontentment	with	political	and	economic	conditions	in	Malawi.	 In	1994	




and	 extend	 personal	 control	 limited	 by	 some	 of	 the	 same	 conditions	 that	 contributed	 to	 Banda’s	
downfall	 in	1994	 (Resnick	2013,	Cammack	2010,	2011).	Bingu	wa	Mutharika	 introduced	the	FISP	 in	
2005	after	Bakili	Muluzi	had	abolished	the	Master	Farmer	Programme	and	other	 remaining	Banda-
era	 subsidies	 at	 the	 start	 of	 his	 time	 in	 power.	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 the	Mutharika	 government	
subsequently	 used	 FISP	 fertiliser	 to	 influence	 the	 2009	 elections	 in	 its	 favour,	 but	 it	 is	 unclear	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 it	 could	 have	 influenced	 voting	 at	 the	 local	 level	 (Brazys	 et	 al	 2015,	 Dionne	 and	
Horowitz	2016).	Mutharika’s	promotion	of	 chiefs	 in	 so-called	 ‘podium	elevations’	 (Englund	2012	p.	
73-74,	 Eggen	 2011	 p.	 327)	 and	 his	 prevarication	 over	 holding	 local	 government	 elections	 can	 be	
interpreted	 as	 attempts	 to	 extend	 control	 of	 Malawian	 politics,	 through	 using	 the	 hierarchy	 of	
traditional	 authority	 (Cammack	 2011)12.	 Donors	 certainly	 viewed	Mutharika’s	 actions	 as	means	 to	
personalise	 the	 government,	 and	 responded	 by	 suspending	 aid	 in	 2011	 (Cammck	 2011).	 The	















having	 more	 people	 declaring	 dependence	 upon	 him	 as	 chief	 than	 leaving	 him.	 The	 rather	 more	
unpredictable	and	fluid	nature	of	political	dependencies	in	the	multi-party	era	means	that	chiefs	and	
government	 officials	 are	 in	 greater	 competition	 for	 supporters	 than	 they	 were	 under	 Banda	




















I	 began	 this	 article	 responding	 to	 James	 Ferguson’s	 (2015,	 2013)	 call	 that	 researchers	 pay	 close	















The	nature	of	the	 ‘freedom’	that	the	 institution	of	chieftaincy	confers	on	poor	rural	Malawians	 like	
those	 living	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 village,	 and	 the	way	 the	 FISP	 plays	 into	 that	 freedom	 is	made	
clearer	against	the	backdrop	of	history.	Harri	Englund	(2012)	describes	the	way	villagers	celebrated	




Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three	 died,	 rather	 than	 when	 FISP	 was	 first	 rolled	 out	 in	 2005.	 The	 resources	
		
available	through	FISP	were,	on	their	own,	not	so	great	as	to	make	leaving	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	a	











faced	 little	 obligation	 to	 distribute	 resources	 to	 those	 below	 them.	 In	 certain	 cases	 even	 Village	
Heads	 like	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three	 may	 be	 able	 to	 ‘just	 go	 ahead’	 ignoring	 the	 petitions	 of	 their	
people,	 because	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 their	 connections	 outside	 of	 their	 villages.	 The	 conditions	 of	
contemporary	Malawian	politics	do	give	some	incentive	to	chiefs	at	all	levels	to	distribute	a	minimum	
of	resources	to	their	dependents.	However,	until	options	to	make	new	‘declarations	of	dependence’,	







































































































































development	 practice	 and	 policy	 making.	 In	 December	 2011,	 the	 Bath	 Papers	 in	 International	
Development	(BPD)	working	paper	series	was	merged	with	the	Wellbeing	in	Developing	Countries	
(WeD)	Working	Paper	Series,	which	has	now	been	discontinued.	The	new	series,	Bath	Papers	 in	
International	Development	and	Well-Being	continues	the	numbering	of	the	BPD	series.	
	
Bath	Papers	in	International	Development	and	Well-Being	(BPIDW)	
Bath	Papers	in	International	Development	and	Well-Being	publishes	research	and	policy	analysis	by	
scholars	and	development	practitioners	in	the	CDS	and	its	wider	network.	 Submissions	to	the	series	
are	encouraged;	submissions	should	be	directed	to	the	Series	Editor,	and	will	be	subject	to	a	blind	
peer	review	process	prior	to	acceptance.	
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